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WEATHERING WAL-MART
Joseph A. Seiner *
“The Sky Is Falling!”
-Henny Penny, Chicken Little1
ABSTRACT
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2531 (2011), the Supreme Court held
that a proposed class of over a million women that had alleged pay and promotion discrimination against the nation’s largest retailer could not be certified. According to the Court, the plaintiffs had failed to establish a common thread in the case sufficient to tie their claims together. The
academic response to Wal-Mart was immediate and harsh: the decision will serve as the death
knell for mass employment litigation, undermining the workplace protections provided by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). This Article embraces the view offered by scholars
to date and does not engage the debate over the extent to which Wal-Mart will eviscerate the
employment rights of workers.
Instead, this Article attempts to find a solution to the problem created by Wal-Mart. The
academic literature has yet to thoroughly explore possible ways to minimize the impact of the
Court’s decision, and this Article seeks to fill that void in the scholarship. Though the case
undoubtedly weakens the ability of Title VII plaintiffs to pursue class action claims, the decision
still leaves substantial room for creative approaches to systemic discrimination. This Article
offers three such solutions to the problem created by Wal-Mart: the governmental approach, the
procedural response, and revised relief. This Article critiques each approach, and explains how
they are useful in pursuing workplace cases that involve company-wide discrimination. This
Article also situates these proposals in the context of the existing literature.
The thesis of this Article is simple. Taking at face value the argument of scholars that WalMart has created a gaping hole for victims of systemic discrimination, this Article asks what tools
are still available for plaintiffs to help fill that hole. Wal-Mart signals a sea change for mass
© 2014 Joseph A. Seiner. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Joseph Seiner is a professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law. The
author would like to thank Benjamin Gutman, Jocelyn Larkin, Suja Thomas, Daniel Vail,
and Michael Zimmer for their helpful thoughts on this Article. The author would also like
to thank those participants at the Labor and Employment Law Colloquium held at the
Northwestern University School of Law and the Loyola University Chicago School of Law
for their helpful comments on this paper. This paper also benefited greatly from the
comments of those participants at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. Any errors or
misstatements are entirely my own.
1 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 21 n.27 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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employment litigation. The challenge now will be to find imaginative ways of pursuing systemic
discrimination claims. This Article takes on that challenge.

INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,2 there has been an outpouring of critics decrying the case
as one that will completely eviscerate the employment protections of workers
across the country.3 In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court held that a class of over
a million women that had alleged pay and promotion discrimination against
the nation’s largest retailer could not be certified under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.4 The Court concluded that the claims of the purported
class lacked the commonality necessary for certification.5
The academic response to Wal-Mart was swift, and scholars immediately
denounced the decision as one that undermines the rights of workplace discrimination victims.6 This assessment of Wal-Mart is correct, as the class
action tool has been critical to the enforcement of employment protections
for thousands of workers subjected to discrimination.7 This Article thus
embraces the early literature that has criticized the case as problematic for
civil rights litigants. The Court’s decision undoubtedly left a void for plaintiffs attempting to vindicate their rights in the face of company-wide discrimination—thus creating the Wal-Mart gap.
While accurately identifying the problem, the academic scholarship has
yet to thoroughly explore possible solutions to the Wal-Mart gap. This Article
attempts to fill that void in the literature and proposes several ways for plaintiffs to minimize the negative impact of this decision. Wal-Mart is a problem
for civil rights litigants, but it is far from a disaster. This paper takes at face
value the argument of many scholars that Wal-Mart has weakened the protections for Title VII victims.8 Thus, this Article does not engage the ongoing
debate over whether—and to what extent—Wal-Mart will undercut employee
rights. Instead, this paper responds to a more basic inquiry: Where do we go
from here?
Rather than focusing on the various protections Wal-Mart may have
taken from plaintiffs, it is useful to explore those rights that still remain. The
decision still leaves sufficient room for creative approaches to systemic discrimination, and there are many ways to handle these situations. A significant tool has been lost for plaintiffs, but many avenues to recovery still exist.
This Article identifies three broad approaches to addressing systemic discrimination in light of Wal-Mart: the governmental approach, the procedural
2 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
3 See infra Part II (discussing reaction to Wal-Mart decision).
4 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
5 Id. at 2552.
6 See infra Part II (discussing scholarship addressing the Wal-Mart decision).
7 See infra Part II (discussing use of class action in employment discrimination cases).
8 See infra note 61 (setting forth various articles critiquing the Wal-Mart decision).
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response, and revised relief. This Article carefully critiques each approach
and explains how they may be useful in the context of company-wide
discrimination.
The governmental approach suggests that the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—which is not bound by the
constraints of the Wal-Mart decision—should become more aggressive in pursuing pervasive discrimination.9 The governmental approach is particularly
appealing as the EEOC is in a unique position to evaluate systemic claims.
The EEOC reviews all charges arising from private-sector discrimination and
is thus able to quickly identify and correct widespread workplace abuse.10
The government is also free from the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, so it can pursue systemic discrimination claims without needing to satisfy the typical class action requirements of commonality, typicality,
numerosity, and adequacy of representation.11 This approach thus offers a
class-action-like mechanism that would help enforce the employment rights
of victimized workers.
The procedural approach offers a more creative response to Wal-Mart.
This approach explores different procedural paths to minimizing the Court’s
decision. First, offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel can be used effectively by plaintiffs to streamline litigation where multiple workers have sued
an employer individually.12 By resolving common issues in these cases only a
single time, the courts and litigants will recognize substantial judicial efficiencies. As common employment policies, managers, and discriminatory facts
frequently pervade these cases, collateral estoppel is an often overlooked, yet
effective tool for addressing multiple claims in workplace disputes. Similarly,
judges may also streamline discrimination claims by consolidating cases that
are brought against the same employer.13 Unlike collateral estoppel, where
an issue is resolved in an earlier case for subsequent litigation, consolidation
allows important questions to be decided at the same time.14 By trying multiple claims or issues through a single trial, the courts have significant discretion and authority to simplify employment litigation.
An additional procedural response to Wal-Mart would be to pursue a
litigation strategy that attempts to limit the impact of the decision. Wal-Mart
can be seen as a unique class action case, involving the single largest workplace dispute brought against the country’s biggest private employer.15 In its
decision, the Court repeatedly emphasized both the size of the employer and
9 See infra Section II.A (discussing issue of whether EEOC is bound by Wal-Mart).
10 See infra Section II.A (discussing administrative process for filing Title VII discrimination charges).
11 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980).
12 See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402
(2002 & Supp. 2013).
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
14 Id.
15 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (“Wal-Mart is the Nation’s
largest private employer.”).
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the enormity of the case that had been brought.16 An argument can thus be
made that the decision should only apply to Wal-Mart itself or to the handful
of other corporations that might be similarly situated. By cabining Wal-Mart,
the lower courts could limit the scope of the decision to only the largest cases
brought against the biggest employers.
A final procedural strategy would be to take Wal-Mart at its word—an
approach contrary to any efforts at cabining the decision. Pursuant to this
strategy, plaintiffs who might otherwise pursue class action claims would
instead file suit individually against the employer. An employer that would
typically face a single class action claim would instead find itself defending
against hundreds or even thousands of individual cases.17 By embracing WalMart, plaintiffs could overwhelm employers through carefully orchestrated
mass individual litigation.
In addition to the governmental and procedural responses to the
Court’s decision, this Article advocates taking a renewed look at the relief
available to discrimination victims. In light of the Wal-Mart decision, the
time has come to re-evaluate the effectiveness of punitive damages under
Title VII. Punitive relief serves many of the same goals as class action litigation in workplace disputes—deterrence, retribution, and education.18 The
sting of Wal-Mart could thus be substantially lessened by adopting a more
vibrant role for punitive relief in employment cases.
Though the suggestions proposed in this paper cannot completely undo
the damage caused by the Court’s decision, they can go a long way toward
minimizing its impact. With the weight of the decision bearing down on
employment discrimination victims, innovative approaches to mass litigation
are critical to weakening the blow of the decision. This Article attempts to
take a creative look at alternative solutions, but the suggestions it offers are
by no means exhaustive. Instead, this Article opens a dialogue on various
ways to approach the problem. No solution, however, can completely take
the place of the class action mechanism in employment discrimination cases.
These solutions can only help to fill the Wal-Mart gap and to help prevent the
sky from completely falling on discrimination victims.
This paper begins by providing a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions impacting mass litigation in the employment discrimination
context.19 Next, this Article offers different approaches to Wal-Mart, specifically exploring possible governmental and procedural responses to the decision. The Article then examines the possibility of revising the relief available
in workplace cases, carefully critiquing this approach.20 This Article con16 See id. at 2547, 2552, 2555–57.
17 As the Wal-Mart case illustrates, there could even be over a million individual claims
of discrimination. See id. at 2547.
18 See infra note 209 (noting scholarship discussing the role of punitive damages in
litigation).
19 See infra Part I (providing an overview of Wal-Mart and Concepcion cases).
20 See infra Part II.
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cludes by situating the ideas offered here in the context of the broader academic scholarship.21
I. WAL-MART (AND

A

NOTE ABOUT CONCEPCION)

Though decided recently, there is already an abundance of scholarship
outlining the Wal-Mart decision. This Article thus provides a more limited
review of the case, focusing only on the key elements of the decision.
In Wal-Mart, a proposed class of over one million current and former
workers sued the country’s largest employer for sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22 The plaintiffs maintained that the
pay and promotion practices of Wal-Mart ran afoul of the statute.23 The
lower court had approved the certification of this class, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2) had been satisfied.24
Wal-Mart, a nation-wide retailer, placed pay and promotion issues within
the “local managers’ broad discretion,” which often resulted in subjective
decisions.25 The plaintiffs maintained that this subjective process resulted in
an unlawful disparate impact against women, as men had been advantaged at
the company in pay and promotion decisions.26 The plaintiffs further
alleged intentional discrimination, as Wal-Mart was purportedly aware of this
discriminatory impact, yet did nothing to change its procedures.27 The
plaintiffs also alleged that certification of the class was appropriate, as there
was “a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ ” of bias at the company, to
which every female employee was subjected.28 The victims sought both monetary and injunctive relief.29
Reviewing these facts, the Supreme Court considered whether the class
should be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.30 Under this
rule, the plaintiffs had to show numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation to certify the class.31 Additionally, under Rule
23(b)(2)—on which the plaintiffs relied—there must be a further showing
that “ ‘final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.’ ”32
The Court concluded that the “crux of the case” centered around Rule
23(a)(2), and whether there was sufficient commonality between the
21 See infra Part III.
22 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2548.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)).
32 Id. at 2548–49 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)).
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claims.33 Thus, individuals must “ ‘have suffered the same injury,’ ” and there
must be a common question “capable of classwide resolution.”34 The Court
thus looked for the “glue” that might bind the alleged discriminatory actions
together.35 However, the majority was unable to find this common thread in
the case.36
The Court rejected the argument that the company had maintained a
“general policy of discrimination,” which would have satisfied this commonality requirement.37 The plaintiffs’ social framework argument that there was
a “corporate culture” of discrimination at Wal-Mart failed as it lacked any
specificity.38 And, the discretion given to Wal-Mart managers in making pay
and promotion decisions suggested that these decisions were individualized.39 Thus, there was no uniform, across-the-board policy of discrimination
at the company that would have supported the commonality requirement.40
Similarly, the statistics and anecdotal submissions offered by the plaintiffs also failed to establish any uniform discriminatory policy at Wal-Mart.41
The Court emphasized that the data offered “cannot by itself establish the
uniform, store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.”42 This is particularly true as local supervisors could have
asserted that the number of interested, qualified women in the labor pool in
their area did not “mirror the national or regional statistics.”43 The anecdotal evidence offered to support the statistics was also “too weak” to support
the class claim, as there were simply not enough instances presented.44 In
proportional terms, there was only one anecdotal discriminatory experience
offered per 12,500 class members, implicating only 235 of the 3400 total
stores.45 These numbers fell far short of establishing a pattern or practice of
discrimination at the company.46
33 Id. at 2550–51.
34 Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
35 Id. at 2552.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2553.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2554.
40 Id. The Court noted, “Respondents have not identified a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company—aside from their reliance on [a] social
frameworks analysis that we have rejected.” Id. at 2554–55.
41 Id. at 2555.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2556.
45 Id. The majority also took issue with the dissent’s argument that the decision mixes
the commonality finding with “Rule 23(b)(3)’s inquiry into whether common questions
‘predominate’ over individual ones.” Id. The Court noted that it “consider[s] dissimilarities not in order to determine . . . whether common questions predominate, but in order to
determine . . . whether there is even a single common question. And there is not here.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id. at 2555.
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The Court thus believed that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the
commonality requirement of the federal rules. The Court summarized its
view that the massive class claim should not be certified by quoting Chief
Judge Kozinski’s dissenting opinion in the lower court, which noted that the
class members
“held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states,
with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of
regional policies that all differed . . . . Some thrived while others did poorly.
They have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit.”47

The Court thus rejected the plaintiffs’ attempts to certify the class and
reversed the lower court’s holding. The Court also determined that the
plaintiffs’ backpay claims should not have been certified pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2).48 That rule does not permit certification where victims “would be
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.”49 After this decision, then, monetary claims cannot be certified where “the monetary relief is
not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief” in the case.50
Four Justices dissented from the opinion, highly criticizing the decision.51 The dissent largely took issue with the majority’s interpretation of the
“commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).52 The dissent accused the
majority of importing the “predominance” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) to
the commonality test, thus improperly “blend[ing]” the two rules and raising
the bar for plaintiffs.53 In the dissent’s view, the discretion that supervisors
exercised in making pay and promotion decisions created a class-wide
issue.54 As the dissent argued, “A system of delegated discretion . . . is a
practice actionable under Title VII when it produces discriminatory
outcomes.”55
47 Id. at 2557 (alteration in original) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d
571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)). As the Court also noted, “Other than
the bare existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified no ‘specific
employment practice’—much less one that ties all their 1.5 million claims together.
Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.” Id. at 2555–56.
48 Id. at 2557.
49 Id. The Court noted that they “think it clear that individualized monetary claims
belong in Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. at 2558.
50 Id. at 2557. This Article focuses much more heavily on the commonality discussion
set forth in the Court’s opinion. For this reason, only a brief summary of the Court’s
backpay analysis is addressed. See id. at 2557–61.
51 Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 2561–62.
53 Id. at 2561–66. Under Rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiffs must show “questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for . . . adjudicating
the controversy.” Id. at 2566 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Id. at 2567.
55 Id.
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Wal-Mart was the second recent Supreme Court opinion to limit the
complex litigation rights of workers, as the Court had decided AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion less than two months earlier.56 In Concepcion, the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California law, thus
restricting the ability of individuals in the case to pursue complex arbitration
claims.57 In its decision, the Court expressed significant concerns over classwide arbitration, noting that it “requires procedural formality” and “makes
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
morass.”58 Though Concepcion arose in the context of a consumer dispute, its
implications for workplace litigants are substantial, as many employers
require that employees arbitrate workplace discrimination claims.59 While
Concepcion is beyond the scope of this Article, it demonstrates the difficulty
plaintiffs now face when attempting to address systemic workplace
discrimination.60
II. RESPONSES

TO

WAL-MART

The Wal-Mart decision is problematic. Scholars immediately—and correctly—denounced the case as one that undermines the rights of workplace
discrimination victims.61 Wal-Mart takes away a significant tool from many of
56 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
57 Id. at 1753.
58 Id. at 1751 (emphasis omitted).
59 See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282 (2002) (discussing arbitration agreements in the employment context); see also Edward A. Marshall, Title VII’s Participation Clause and Circuit City Stores v. Adams: Making the Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 75 (2003) (noting that “more employers [are] seeking to
impose pre-dispute arbitration agreements on their employees . . . and more courts [are]
willing to hold that Title VII claims fall within the scope of disputes that may be subject to
compulsory arbitration”).
60 See L. Camille Hébert, The Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 279,
280 (2011) (noting that Wal-Mart and Concepcion “will make it substantially easier for
employers to avoid facing class actions by their employees challenging their employment
practices, meaning that in many cases, those employers will avoid facing legal challenges by
their employees at all”); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) (“In the near future, we can expect
that even more companies will impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate
themselves from class actions because Concepcion has changed the calculus.”).
61 See generally Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 397 (2011) (“[T]he Court did more than pull the procedural rug
out from under the decade-long lawsuit; it called into question the future of systemic disparate treatment law.”); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 455, 457 (2011) (“Individual claims alone simply will not ensure—or even permit—
full enforcement of federal civil rights laws.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The
Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 34 (2011), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/18/LRColl2011n18
Malveaux.pdf (discussing the future of class actions after Wal-Mart); George Rutherglen,
Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
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those plaintiffs that allege employment discrimination. The Title VII class
action suit has provided significant benefits to victims over the years, and
even the threat of this type of litigation serves as an incentive to employers to
avoid engaging in unlawful behavior.62 Class action cases also tend to make
headlines, thus educating the public of the ongoing problems of employment discrimination.63 And, in many ways, these cases punish employers that
have permitted widespread systemic discrimination to pervade the workplace.
The negative impact of the decision for employment discrimination victims
can thus not be overstated.64
Putting aside the debate over the extent to which Wal-Mart is a problem
for plaintiffs, this Article assumes that the problem exists and attempts to
identify those avenues that still remain for addressing systemic discrimination. This Part outlines three broad approaches to filling the gap left by WalMart for class action litigants: the governmental approach, the procedural
response, and revised relief. This Article critiques each approach, and
explains how each may be useful in providing relief to those suffering from
systemic discrimination. The three approaches explored here are not meant
to be exhaustive, and there are certainly numerous ways that plaintiffs may
address the Wal-Mart decision. Instead, this Article simply explores three viable avenues that litigants may pursue in light of this controversial case.

24, 24 (2012) (discussing the decline of deterrent class action suits); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 477, 479 (2011) (“It is not yet clear what impact the Court’s Wal-Mart decision will have
but it is likely to make certification of a nationwide class far more difficult.”); Noah D. Zatz,
Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 387 (2011) (“Wal-Mart v. Dukes opens up a third dimension to the
ongoing judicial enfeeblement of employment discrimination law.”).
62 See Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay
Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1337 (1990) (“An aggregate class-based recovery can have
substantial economic repercussions, and the threat of affirmative relief serves as a substantial incentive to cure disparities.”).
63 For example, the Wal-Mart case itself remained in the headlines for years, thus providing information to the public about the parameters of Title VII. See Jenna Goudreau,
Walmart Faces the Largest Sex Discrimination Lawsuit in U.S. History, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2010,
2:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2010/04/27/wal-mart-faces-thelargest-sex-discrimination-lawsuit-in-u-s-history; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Blocks Massive
Sex-Discrimination Suit Against Wal-Mart, WASH. POST (June 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-blocks-massive-sex-discrimination-suit-against-walmart/2011/06/20/AGCQ81cH_story.html.
64 Cf. Nicole Hitch, Reconsidering the Scope and Consequences of Appellate Review in the
Certification Decision of Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 747, 759 (2006)
(noting that scholars have identified the benefits of class actions to “include (1) facilitating
judicial economy, (2) affording a remedy to victims who cannot obtain relief through individual actions, (3) spreading the costs of litigation in order to enhance access to the courts,
(4) protecting defendants from multiple, inconsistent verdicts, and (5) adequately protecting the interests of absent class members”).
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A. The Governmental Approach
Perhaps the most obvious response to Wal-Mart is insisting that the case
applies only to private plaintiffs bringing suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. Thus, governmental agencies, such as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), are not subject to the decision.
The EEOC is free to step in and fill the Wal-Mart gap by bringing cases of
widespread systemic discrimination.65
Indeed, the EEOC is not even subject to the requirements of Rule 2366
and can proceed with pattern-or-practice litigation even if it is unable to satisfy this rule.67 As the Supreme Court clearly held over three decades ago in
General Telephone v. EEOC, “Rule 23 is not applicable to an enforcement
action brought by the [Commission] in its own name and pursuant to its
authority . . . to prevent unlawful employment practices.”68 In a pattern-orpractice claim, the government must satisfy certain basic statutory requirements prior to filing the case.69 These administrative prerequisites include
filing a charge against the employer, providing notice, conducting an investigation that results in a determination of reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred, and making an effort to conciliate the matter.70
Once these prerequisites have been completed, the EEOC is free to file suit
in the matter and need not satisfy the requirements of commonality, typicality, numerosity, or adequacy of representation found under the federal rules
for class actions.71
One response to Wal-Mart, then, would be for the EEOC to become
more involved in filing pattern-or-practice claims. A more vibrant governmental approach to systemic employment discrimination could thus help fill
the Wal-Mart gap.72 The EEOC is in a particularly appropriate position to
65 See Hart, supra note 61, at 475 (“One possibility [of addressing Wal-Mart] is a
greater reliance on the enforcement efforts of the E.E.O.C. Given that pattern or practice
claims pursued by the E.E.O.C. are not subject to the requirements of Rule 23, these
actions may be a more effective tool for addressing structural discrimination than private
litigation subject to the post-Wal-Mart interpretation of Rule 23.”).
66 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980).
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
68 Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 318.
69 See Charles S. Mishkind & V. Scott Kneese, Big Risks and Opportunities, Class Actions
and Pattern and Practice Cases, in 1 30TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 403, 435
(2001).
70 Id. (citing EEOC v. Container Corp. of Am., 352 F. Supp. 262, 264–65 (M.D. Fla.
1972)). See generally Timothy G. Healy, Note, Sexual Pattern: Why a Pattern or Practice Theory
of Liability Is Not an Appropriate Framework for Claims of Sexual Harassment, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 537, 537 (2005) (discussing procedural requirements of pattern-or-practice
claims brought by the EEOC).
71 Mishkind & Kneese, supra note 69, at 435. Indeed, “[t]he EEOC may proceed in a
unified action to obtain the most satisfactory overall relief, despite the fact that competing
interests may be involved and that particular groups may appear to be disadvantaged.” Id.
72 See Hart, supra note 61, at 475 (discussing potential role of EEOC after Wal-Mart
decision).

R
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take on this role, as it should have knowledge of most widespread claims of
workplace abuse. All individuals alleging discrimination in the private sector
are required to file a charge with the EEOC as part of the administrative
process.73 And the EEOC investigates all of these charges and issues a determination.74 As all workplace cases go before the EEOC, the agency could
easily track those instances where systemic discrimination is present and
become more active in pursuing these claims. Indeed, widespread, egregious
discrimination is already a significant consideration used by the agency in
deciding whether to bring suit.75 In a response to Wal-Mart, then, the agency
would simply need to step up its efforts in this regard.
The governmental response to Wal-Mart is appealing for several important reasons. EEOC systemic claims provide several benefits to plaintiffs that
are unavailable through individual litigation. Most notably, the EEOC can
often recover for victims who have not filed a timely charge of discrimination.76 In fact, the government takes the view that it can even recover for
individuals who are not identified until discovery begins.77 Not all courts
agree with this approach, but it demonstrates the more flexible nature of
systemic claims brought by the EEOC.78
Additionally, the EEOC will often seek individual monetary relief on
behalf of specific victims.79 This is in addition to the injunctive relief that is
73 See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FILING A CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
[hereinafter EEOC CHARGE PRACTICES], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/
charge.cfm. See generally Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237,
1240–43 (2010) (discussing role of EEOC in addressing workplace discrimination). The
EEOC sets forth its charge filing process on its website.
74 See EEOC CHARGE PRACTICES, supra note 73; Modesitt, supra note 73, at 1241–42.
75 The EEOC identifies its systemic litigation program as core to its fundamental mission. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION, [hereinafter
EEOC SYSTEMIC LITIGATION POLICY], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/systemic/
index.cfm (“The identification, investigation and litigation of systemic discrimination
cases, along with efforts to educate employers and encourage prevention, are integral to
the mission of the EEOC.”).
76 See Mishkind & Kneese, supra note 69, at 435 (“All class members need not satisfy
administrative prerequisites when the EEOC brings an action on behalf of a class. For
instance, in an EEOC action under Title VII, those who were discriminated against beyond
the 300-day EEOC filing period could become class members if one of them alleged a
violation within the 300-day period.”).
77 Cf. EEOC v. United Road Towing, Inc., No. 10 C 6259, 2012 WL 1830099, at *3
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012) (“[T]he Court will not inquire into whether the EEOC’s administrative investigation adequately supported the claims of the 17 claimants on behalf of
whom the EEOC has brought suit.”).
78 See EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 690 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding
that as to four of the alleged discrimination victims in the case, “we will affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on the alternative ground that the EEOC failed to
discharge its pre-suit duties under Title VII to investigate and conciliate these claims, as
they did not even accrue until after the EEOC had instituted the action”).
79 See Jason R. Bent, Systemic Harassment, 77 TENN. L. REV. 151, 193 (2009) (“Currently,
when the EEOC brings a systemic harassment case it typically alleges claims under both
Section 706 and Section 707 and seeks monetary damages as well as injunctive relief.”); see

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL307.txt

1354

unknown

Seq: 12

notre dame law review

11-FEB-14

8:03

[vol. 89:3

also typically sought in pattern-or-practice claims.80 The ability of the government to attain monetary relief for individuals in class-action-type litigation
provides a substantial benefit to discrimination victims. After Wal-Mart, it is
clear that individuals will have considerable difficulty securing this type of
relief through private class actions, even where such actions are allowed.81
As the Court made clear, “claims for monetary relief” cannot be certified
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), “at least where . . . the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief.”82 The
EEOC can thus help fill the Wal-Mart gap by seeking monetary relief through
pattern-or-practice claims.
Finally, if the government is successful in establishing a pattern or practice of discrimination, it obtains a substantial procedural benefit in the case.
Where such discrimination is sufficiently alleged, the burden of proof
switches from the EEOC to the defendant.83 Thus, the company has the burden of establishing that it is not liable for specific instances of discriminatory
conduct.84 This is considerably different from the typical case of individual
discrimination, where the plaintiff maintains the burden of proof throughout the litigation.85
The governmental approach is not without its limitations, however.86
The EEOC is a historically underfunded agency.87 Thus, the government
would likely lack the resources necessary to adequately fill the role previously
also Modesitt, supra note 73, at 1248–49 (discussing monetary relief attained by EEOC for
victims of discrimination).
80 See Bent, supra note 79, at 193 (noting EEOC’s practice of requesting injunctive
relief in certain systemic cases).
81 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–61 (2011).
82 Id. at 2557.
83 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 327 (1977); Ellen M.
Athas, Defendant’s Burden of Proof in Title VII Class Action Disparate Treatment Suits, 31 AM. U.
L. REV. 755, 773 (1982) (“In a pattern or practice suit, the plaintiff must show the existence
of a policy of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut such a
showing by demonstrating that ‘the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or insignificant.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360)); see also Bent, supra note 79, at
156–57 (discussing framework for analyzing systemic discrimination cases provided by the
Supreme Court in Teamsters).
84 See Athas, supra note 83, at 773 (“Once a pattern or practice of discrimination is
proved, the court may infer that any particular employment decision was made according
to that illegal policy.”).
85 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (setting forth the
most commonly used analysis for individual disparate treatment claims). See generally Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 110 (2007) (discussing Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas).
86 Cf. Hart, supra note 61, at 475 (“Of course, the challenge in E.E.O.C. litigation will
be whether defendants can successfully argue that they are entitled to present individualized defenses as to every specific employee in these cases as well.”).
87 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568,
1575 (1996) (“Because of the policymaking void created by the combination of statutory
ambiguity and an underfunded, relatively weak EEOC, other branches and levels of government have clarified and advanced employment discrimination law more aggressively.”).
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played by the private plaintiffs’ bar in pursuing class action suits.88 And, if
the EEOC were to focus its efforts more keenly on systemic discrimination, it
would come at the cost of not pursuing as many cases of individual employment wrongs.89 Cases of individual workplace discrimination also play a critical role in Title VII litigation, and backing away from some of these cases
would certainly undermine the EEOC’s enforcement efforts. The bottomline problem would thus be resources. As an underfunded agency, the
EEOC could choose to pursue more class action cases, but it would come at a
significant cost.90
Similarly, there are substantial differences between EEOC pattern-orpractice litigation and suits brought by the private plaintiffs’ bar.91 Most
notably, the EEOC represents the government, rather than the individual
victims involved.92 While the interests of the two groups certainly overlap,
there are often substantial differences in the goals of litigation between the
victims and the government.93 In particular, there may often be a divergence
in the type of relief the two groups view as appropriate in a particular case.94
Of course, individual plaintiffs would be free to seek their own counsel to
intervene in these matters to protect their rights.95
Finally, there may be some remaining questions as to whether the WalMart decision limits or restructures what a governmental pattern-or-practice
case would look like. It is possible that the strict commonality requirement
adopted by the Wal-Mart Court will also be applied to EEOC pattern-or-practice claims. It is equally possible that the courts will limit the type of relief the
government can seek in these types of actions. These possible limitations
88 Cf. Modesitt, supra note 73, at 1263 (“[T]he EEOC should limit the number of its
cases so that it can provide sufficient resources to do the job properly when it elects to do
so.”).
89 Cf. id. at 1260–65 (proposing more effective use of EEOC’s limited resources).
90 See, e.g., EEOC v. Britrail Travel Int’l Corp., 733 F. Supp. 855, 862 n.10 (D.N.J. 1990)
(“The court appreciates the EEOC, like many government agencies, may well be overworked, underfunded and understaffed.”).
91 See generally Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (discussing the role of EEOC
and private attorneys in enforcing employment discrimination law).
92 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287 (2002) (noting “the difference
between the EEOC’s enforcement role and an individual employee’s private cause of
action”).
93 See id.; Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (“When the
EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.”).
94 See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279; Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 326 (“Although the EEOC
can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay or benefits denied, on behalf of discrimination victims, the agency is
guided by ‘the overriding public interest in equal employment opportunity . . . asserted
through direct Federal enforcement.’” (citation omitted)).
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (“The person or persons aggrieved shall have the
right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or the Attorney General in a
case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.”).
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seem unlikely, however. Wal-Mart was decided specifically under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.96 And the Court was clear that the contours of
that rule were driving its decision. However, the Supreme Court has held
that the EEOC is not subject to Rule 23, and the Wal-Mart decision would
thus be largely inapplicable to governmental actions.97 Notably, the EEOC
has already taken the position that Wal-Mart does not impact its authority to
pursue systemic discrimination claims.98 Nonetheless, it is difficult to forecast how the lower courts will interpret Wal-Mart in the context of pattern-orpractice cases.
In sum, the governmental approach is appealing. It offers a class-actionlike mechanism to fill much of the Wal-Mart gap. It allows the government to
seek both monetary and injunctive relief for employment discrimination victims, even where a timely charge has not been filed. And, there are notable
procedural benefits to this type of litigation. However, it is far from a perfect
solution. The government simply lacks the resources necessary to completely
take over all systemic claims. And the interests of the government are not
always aligned with those of individual plaintiffs. Finally, there may be some
question as to whether Wal-Mart itself undermines the EEOC’s ability to
bring pattern-or-practice claims.99
B. Procedural Responses
In addition to the governmental approach, there are also many procedural vehicles available to plaintiffs that could help fill the Wal-Mart gap. These
procedural responses help address the shortcomings of individual litigation
where the employer discrimination is pervasive and widespread. These procedural responses would thus tend to focus on the similarity in issues
between the various victims of employment discrimination and help find ways
of streamlining this litigation before the courts. Though there are numerous
ways to approach systemic discrimination from a procedural perspective,
96 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011) (“We consider
whether the certification of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).”).
97 See Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 326 (“The aggrieved person may also intervene in the
EEOC’s enforcement action. These private-action rights suggest that the EEOC is not
merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination and that the EEOC’s enforcement suits
should not be considered representative actions subject to Rule 23.”).
98 See EEOC’s Opposition to Texas Roadhouse’s Motion to Dismiss at 11 n.8, EEOC v.
Tex. Roadhouse, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-11732-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2012); EEOC’s Response in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 12, EEOC v.
Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, No. 11-CV-03425 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2012) (“Here, the Commission is not subject to the requirements of Rule 23, does not have to prove commonality,
has not engaged in discovery, and does not allege the same kind of pattern or practice of
discrimination as the plaintiffs alleged in Wal-Mart. In sum, Wal-Mart is inapposite.”).
99 See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409 (2012) (discussing impact of Wal-Mart
decision).
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using collateral estoppel, consolidating cases, and cabining Wal-Mart deserve
particular attention.100
1. Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
One currently overlooked response to the Wal-Mart decision would be
for plaintiffs to more aggressively use collateral estoppel as part of their litigation strategy. This procedural mechanism could be considered where victims
face similar issues or fact patterns arising from a single employer. The classic
definition of collateral estoppel provides that it “bars the relitigation of issues
actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation
between the same parties.”101 Also known as issue preclusion, it is commonly
stated that collateral estoppel requires more than that “some question of fact
or law in a later suit was relevant to a prior adjudication between the parties.”102 Instead, “the contested issue must have been litigated and necessary
to the judgment earlier rendered.”103
Collateral estoppel serves to prevent important issues from being retried
in subsequent litigation.104 The Supreme Court has clarified that “mutuality
of parties” is not necessary for claims of issue preclusion.105 Thus, a plaintiff
need not have been directly involved in prior litigation with the defendant to
avail itself of this doctrine.106 Offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel
therefore allows plaintiffs to prevent the defendant from relitigating questions that have already been resolved, even where a different plaintiff was
involved in the earlier case.107 There are obvious concerns in the application
of this doctrine, which is why the Supreme Court was clear that the lower
courts would have “broad discretion” in how (and whether) it is utilized.108
100 One additional procedural response to Wal-Mart, not addressed here, is the potential use of issue class certification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an
action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”).
Issue class certification has the potential to be a highly effective tool when pursuing systemic-type employment litigation. Given the breadth of this issue, however, the author
intends to address Rule 23(c)(4) in a subsequent paper.
101 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 4402 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id.; see also 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 928 (2012) (“Issue preclusion . . . may apply in a
second action . . . , but does not extend beyond the matter actually litigated and determined in the first action.”); 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2012) (“Collateral estoppel . . .
refers to the effect of a prior judgment in limiting or precluding relitigation of issues that
were actually litigated in the previous action, regardless of whether the previous action was
based on the same cause of action as the second suit.”).
105 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–28 (1979). “Under this mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a prior judgment as an estoppel against the other
unless both parties were bound by the judgment.” Id. at 326–27.
106 Id. at 327.
107 Id. at 329–31.
108 Id. at 331; see Steven P. Nonkes, Note, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual Issue
Preclusion Through Damages Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1460–61 (2009) (“Allowing
issue preclusion in the absence of mutuality raises serious fairness concerns, however, and
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The touchstone in this regard is the question of fairness.109 Offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel should only be used “on a case-by-case basis
depending on whether the prerequisites of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action and fairness are present.”110
In deciding whether the lower courts should permit the offensive use of
issue preclusion, the Supreme Court outlined four different factors to consider.111 These factors all work to ensure fairness in the application of the
doctrine:
First, the [plaintiff] “probably could not have joined in [the prior] action.”
Second, the seriousness of the case and the possibility of subsequent claims
by private parties gave the defendants substantial incentive to contest the
first action. Third, the decision in the [prior] action did not contradict any
previous decision. Finally, no new procedural advantages likely to produce a
different result had accrued to the defendants in the second action.112

Simply put, then, plaintiffs may use collateral estoppel where they could
not have joined the prior case, where the prior case was of substantial significance to the defendant, where there is no conflict between the prior decision
and other holdings, and where different procedural issues are not involved in
the new case.113 And these elements must all be weighed by the district
court, whose decision should be given significant deference.114
The offensive use of collateral estoppel would provide an important procedural mechanism for plaintiffs to fill the Wal-Mart gap in employment discrimination cases. It is not uncommon for an employer to discriminate
against multiple individuals.115 And where this discrimination occurs at a
single employment site, there are likely to be many of the same issues, facts,
and policies involved in the case.
Take, for example, a typical hostile-environment case where a male
supervisor harasses several female workers. In this type of case, there may not
be enough individuals involved to certify a class action, or the claims may not
have sufficient commonality.116 Nonetheless, the potential claims would
likely share several important issues and facts, such as whether the employer
had an effective employment policy in place, whether the alleged harasser
was acting as a supervisor under the law of the particular jurisdiction, or
it may distort the litigation process by providing incentives for litigants to overlitigate, lulling them into underlitigating, or causing them to shift the timing of their suits.”).
109 See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 571 (2012).
110 Id.
111 See John Bernard Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 41–42 (1985) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at
332–33).
112 Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 332–33).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Joseph A. Seiner, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Employment Discrimination, 97
IOWA L. REV. 473, 495 (2012) (“An employer that discriminates against one individual may
often discriminate against others as well.”).
116 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth requirements to certify a class).
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whether the employer had knowledge that any harassment had occurred.117
Where established in one case, these facts should not have to be relitigated in
subsequent actions.118 By resolving common issues only once, future cases
would be streamlined, leading to significant judicial economies.119 Collateral estoppel could thus significantly help reduce the role of burdensome
litigation in these types of cases.
It is not unusual for an employer to be sued by multiple plaintiffs, and
where common facts or policies are involved in the litigation, there would be
little reason for a court to resolve these issues more than a single time.120 By
permitting the plaintiffs to estop the issues from being raised in subsequent
litigation, the courts would go a long way toward filling the Wal-Mart gap.
One key element of the offensive use of collateral estoppel is that it is
only permitted where the issue has arisen in a serious case in which the
employer has had “substantial incentive to contest the . . . action.”121 Thus,
before an employer can be estopped from contesting an issue, it must have
seriously litigated the issue in something other than a minor action. In the
context of employment discrimination, this likely would not be a difficult
element for most plaintiffs to establish, as the employer would have substantial incentive to vigorously defend all allegations of discrimination brought in
federal court. An employer is likely to take all such cases, and the corresponding issues therein, very seriously. Nonetheless, issues that are simply
incidental to the initial litigation, or issues raised in minor cases (such as
frivolous claims brought by pro se plaintiffs), will not be dispositive against
the employer in other matters.122
This solution is not perfect, and the offensive use of collateral estoppel
falls far short of providing the benefits of a true class action claim. Unlike
collateral estoppel cases, not all parties to a class action would need to have
117 See generally Stephen F. Befort & Sarah J. Gorajski, When Quitting Is Fitting: The Need
for a Reformulated Sexual Harassment/Constructive Discharge Standard in the Wake of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 643 (2006) (setting forth legal standards for harassment cases).
118 See Piper Hoffman, How Many Plaintiffs Are Enough? Venue in Title VII Class Actions, 42
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843, 862 (2009) (“In Title VII cases those inefficiencies would be
particularly egregious given that plaintiffs nationwide would rely, for the most part, on the
same evidence, such as the employer’s documented human resources policies, its documented complaint procedures, the testimony of human resources professionals, and statistical analyses suggesting company-wide discrimination.”).
119 See Nonkes, supra note 108, at 1460 (noting that the “[p]rimary reasons” for courts
not requiring mutuality “include judicial efficiency and assurance of consistent results”).
120 See Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C.
L. REV. 367, 374–79 (2008) (discussing class action litigation in the workplace context).
121 Corr, supra note 111, at 42.
122 See Joshua M.D. Segal, Note, Rebalancing Fairness and Efficiency: The Offensive Use of
Collateral Estoppel in § 1983 Actions, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2009) (noting that courts
should examine “whether there was a sufficient incentive to fully litigate the claim” before
applying collateral estoppel).
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filed timely charges of discrimination.123 Thus, class action claims would
allow more plaintiffs to bring suit than would the use of the procedural
mechanism suggested here. Similarly, class action claims will often put more
dollars at stake as part of the initial suit, which forces defendants to seriously
consider settling the claims.124 Though collateral estoppel may have some
negative effects on portions of an employer’s subsequent cases, it would not
have the same potential financial impact on an employer as class cases.
Rather, the damages would likely be lower and spread out over time.125
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, class actions have the benefit of substantially streamlining the litigation on the issue of liability. Though collateral estoppel offers the potential for significant judicial economies by
resolving certain issues before the court, it falls far short of the economies
offered under Rule 23.126 This is particularly true as the ultimate question—
the issue of liability—must still be tried in every case.127
In sum, the offensive use of collateral estoppel cannot take the place of
the class action in employment discrimination cases. Nonetheless, this procedural mechanism would help fill the Wal-Mart gap by avoiding the relitigation of issues that have already been resolved. Combined with other
procedural tools offered below, issue preclusion offers several benefits to the
traditional single employee-employer litigation often brought in the federal
courts. Collateral estoppel has not been seriously explored in the academic
literature as a means of streamlining employment discrimination claims. In
light of Wal-Mart, the use of issue preclusion must be considered as a way of
avoiding the needless relitigation of issues that have already been resolved.
2. Consolidation
Other procedural mechanisms may also help fill the Wal-Mart gap. Similar to the use of collateral estoppel, judges may also streamline employment
discrimination claims with common issues through the consolidation of cases
against the same employer, which is allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).128 Consolidation is effective “as a matter of convenience and
123 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547–48 (2011) (identifying
three named plaintiffs who filed discrimination charges on behalf of the plaintiff class).
124 See Levit, supra note 120, at 367–68 (“These cases have produced scores of multimillion-dollar settlements against some of the nation’s largest employers.”).
125 See generally Nonkes, supra note 108, at 1462 (discussing the use of collateral estoppel and damages).
126 See Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: An Answer to Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 401 (2011) (“The class action device is designed to
achieve judicial economy because aggregate litigation is more efficient than litigating similar individual cases seriatim.”).
127 Id. (describing that after a class-wide finding of liability, individual class members
will seek individual relief).
128 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that where “actions before the court
involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or
all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders
to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
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economy in judicial administration” where “separate actions present[ ] a
common issue of law or fact.”129 Again, substantial deference is given to the
district court’s decision as to whether to consolidate the matters.130 Unlike
collateral estoppel, where an issue is resolved in an earlier case for subsequent litigation, consolidation allows important issues to be resolved at the
same time.131 Thus, consolidation offers the benefit of allowing an issue to be
resolved as part of a single proceeding.
Consolidation can take two primary forms. First, where there is a “common question of law or fact,” a judge can “join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions.”132 Second, the judge can simply “consolidate
the actions.”133 Under the federal rules, the court thus has substantial discretion in how to organize the consolidation of a case or issue.134
By trying multiple claims or issues through a single trial, the courts are
able to simplify the litigation.135 Witnesses are only required to testify once,
and the court and parties are subject to a single suit on a particular issue.136
Similarly, one trial is likely to be resolved much more quickly and inexpensively than multiple proceedings.137 And, there is less risk that the trier-offact will resolve the disputes differently, which would lead to a potential
inconsistency of judgments.138 Where the individual allegations differ from
one another, the court can still bifurcate the proceedings to resolve these
specific issues.139
129 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2383, at 26.
130 Id. (“The district court is given broad discretion to decide whether consolidation
under Rule 42(a) would be desirable and the district judge’s decision inevitably is highly
contextual . . . .”).
131 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (allowing consolidation for actions with common questions
of law or fact).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (allowing separate trials “for convenience” to the court).
135 See generally 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1289 (2012) (“[A] transfer may be permitted if it is feasible to consolidate the actions, and if consolidation would be convenient,
would avoid duplicitous litigation, and would avoid inconsistent results.” (footnotes
omitted)).
136 See 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2383, at 35 n.2 (stating that the critical question for the district court was “whether the specific risks of prejudice and confusion were
over borne by the risk of inconsistent adjudications of common issues, the burden on
parties, witnesses and judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time
required to conduct multiple lawsuits instead of one and the relative expense” to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives).
137 Id.
138 Id.; see also 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1289 (2012); cf. Scott Paetty, Note, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex
Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 886 (2008) (“The purpose of the [consolidation] rule is to enhance trial court efficiency (i.e., to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures) and to avoid the substantial danger of
inconsistent decisions.”).
139 See generally John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore, Bifurcation of Civil Trials, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1, 2–14 (2010) (discussing the bifurcation of civil trials in general).
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In determining whether to consolidate the claims, the court should
weigh these potential benefits against “the specific risks of prejudice and
[possible] confusion” in merging the matters.140 Thus, the benefits involved
should be considered against the chance that the parties may be harmed
through consolidation, or that expanding the scope of the trial will ultimately
confuse the trier-of-fact.141 And from a more practical standpoint, it may
also be difficult to identify or isolate the specific issues or claims that can be
decided jointly. The courts must be cautious in crafting how consolidation
will occur.
Like the offensive use of collateral estoppel, the consolidation of cases
offers a procedural mechanism that is particularly attractive in the employment discrimination context.142 As the policies, managers, facts, and issues
often overlap in workplace disputes, merging separate claims can be an effective and efficient way of managing a court’s trial docket. As discussed above,
harassment provides a useful example of these potential efficiencies. Where
two (or more) individuals allege to have been victimized by the same harasser
over a similar period of time, the two claims will likely involve the presentation of many of the same witnesses and policies. Whether the company has
implemented an effective anti-harassment policy, whether the harasser
involved was a management-level employee, and how the employer
responded to any complaints are all issues that could be resolved as part of a
single trial.143 This type of consolidation would thus streamline the cases
and prevent the needless multiplication of litigation.144 Common issues
could be resolved in a unified manner, and the proceedings could then be
bifurcated as necessary to determine issues that are unique to the individual
cases.145
Again, however, the benefits must be weighed against any potential
prejudice to the parties.146 Such prejudice might arise against the employer,
for example, as multiple victims will be alleging the same type of discrimination against the company. An employer will look far less sympathetic in the
eyes of the trier-of-fact where numerous litigants have come forward with allegations of discrimination. In addition, harassment claims are often fact-specific, and the experiences of one victim may be completely different from

140 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2383, at 35 n.2.
141 Id.
142 Cf. Paetty, supra note 138, at 885 (“Consolidation is another formal tool available
for judges and practitioners to manage complex cases.”).
143 See generally Befort & Gorajski, supra note 117, at 643 (setting forth legal standards
for harassment cases).
144 See generally Paetty, supra note 138, at 886 (discussing possible benefits of
consolidation).
145 See generally Rowley & Moore, supra note 139, at 2–14 (discussing bifurcation of
issues).
146 See 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2383.
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those of another.147 There may be certain instances, then, where consolidation simply does not make sense in the employment context.148
The consolidation of cases or issues provides another procedural tool
that would help fill the Wal-Mart gap in employment discrimination cases.
Again, this procedural mechanism cannot completely take the place of Rule
23.149 The class action offers numerous additional benefits to the simple
consolidation of cases.150 Namely, consolidation does not typically anticipate
the mass litigation of claims across the country involving multiple claimants
in numerous jurisdictions. Rule 23 is much better suited for these types of
claims.151 And, the administrative requirements (such as filing timely discrimination charges) will likely be more relaxed in the class setting.152 Similarly, the actual identification of the victims involved is much less stringent in
the class action context.153 Moreover, the appellate courts have largely concluded that “the pattern-or-practice method of proof is not available to private, nonclass plaintiffs.”154 Additionally, it may be more difficult—and not
as cost effective—to conduct any needed statistical analysis with consolidated
claims (as opposed to traditional class action cases). Furthermore, many
cases that might have only a marginal value associated with them may not
147 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (noting the subjective
inquiry of harassment claims); cf. Forrest v. Brinker Int’l Payroll Co., 511 F.3d 225, 232 (1st
Cir. 2007) (“Determining what constitutes a ‘prompt and appropriate’ employer response
to allegations of sexual harassment often requires the sort of case-specific, fact-intensive
analysis best left to a jury.”).
148 Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1991) (“[S]ome particularly aggrieved individual might attempt to bring a
large group together in a single lawsuit by using standard joinder and intervention devices.
But bringing large numbers of additional parties in by this method would be very costly.
Organizing the conduct of litigation with large numbers of additional parties would be a
nightmare.” (footnote omitted)).
149 See generally Paetty, supra note 138, at 886 (“FRCP 42 gives the trial judge wide latitude in deciding to consolidate cases, and consolidation has become increasingly useful
with the advent of complex litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
150 See Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 519
(1991) (providing an overview of similarities and differences between consolidation and
class certification).
151 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth the requirements to certify a class in federal
court).
152 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547–48 (2011) (describing the
procedural history of the case).
153 Cf. Christodoulos Kaoutzanis, Two Birds with One Stone: How the Use of the Class Action
Device for Victim Participation in the International Criminal Court Can Improve Both the Fight
Against Impunity and Victim Participation, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 149 (2010)
(arguing for use of class actions in a specific context as it would “allow one lawyer to
represent all victims, known and unknown”).
154 Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing cases),
cert. denied sub nom. Eng v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 133 S. Ct. 1724 (2013).
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ultimately be pursued where a class cannot be certified.155 Finally, this procedural tool is not as powerful of a weapon for plaintiffs, who in class action
suits are likely able to command higher settlements through the threat of
systemic litigation.156
Despite these drawbacks, the consolidation of cases or issues is another
way to streamline discrimination claims. And, it offers many of the same
economies of scale available to class action litigants.
3. Cabining Wal-Mart
In addition to the offensive use of collateral estoppel and consolidation,
a third procedural response to Wal-Mart would be for the courts and parties
to limit the reach of the decision. In this regard, Wal-Mart can be seen as a
very unique class action case, involving the single largest workplace suit
brought against the country’s biggest private employer.157
The courts may not want to extrapolate the principles of Wal-Mart
beyond the facts of the decision itself. There are likely to be few, if any,
employment cases as broad as Wal-Mart, which involved over a million individuals.158 As the Court itself recognized, it was “one of the most expansive
class actions ever.”159 Quite simply, then, it is possible that the Wal-Mart
decision may only apply to Wal-Mart, or to the handful of other corporations
that might be seen as similarly situated. By cabining Wal-Mart, the lower
courts would thus limit the scope of the case, and apply the tenets of the
Supreme Court’s decision to only the largest cases brought against the biggest employers.
Given the massive size of Wal-Mart as an employer and the sheer magnitude of the class action brought against the company, it is easy to understand
the Supreme Court’s reluctance in allowing the class action to go forward.
Though the opinion is far from a model of clarity on the application of the
rules of class certification, there is a fair concern over how this type of enormous systemic class would actually proceed.160 Trying a class case on behalf
of over a million individuals would be a difficult, if not impossible, undertak155 See generally Hoffman, supra note 118, at 862 (“[W]ith multi-district coordination for
pre-trial purposes, the complexity and expense of litigating the same issues in multiple
venues would be enormous, sometimes even prohibitive.”).
156 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 120, at 367–68 (discussing settlements in the workplace
class action context); see also Hitch, supra note 64, at 759 (“[C]lass actions, especially
employment discrimination class actions, tend to end in settlement. For example, employers such as Home Depot, Boeing, Winn-Dixie, Amtrak, UPS, and Pennzoil have settled class
action claims in recent years for millions of dollars.”).
157 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547 (“Petitioner Wal-Mart is the Nation’s largest private
employer.”).
158 Id. (“The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the certification of a
class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs . . . .”).
159 Id.
160 See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Curse of Bigness and the Optimal Size of Class Actions, 63
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 117, 118–19 (2010) (discussing concerns raised over the size of the
Wal-Mart litigation).
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ing for the lower court. And it is extremely difficult to imagine what that case
would even look like, or how it would be structured.161 Such a daunting
claim would leave the company with little choice but to settle the action.162
Putting aside both the reasoning and accuracy of the decision, the reluctance of the Court to certify the class is thus easily understood. What is less
clear, however, is how far the principles from the decision should extend.
Given the way in which the decision is framed, it seems a fair reading of the
case to limit the holding to only the largest claims brought against the biggest
employers. In this way, the Court created the “Wal-Mart rule”—a tenet that
requires a strict interpretation of commonality for massive employment discrimination claims.
The decision is replete with instances where the Court expressed concern over the magnitude of the case that had been brought. The Court
repeatedly noted the size of the class and employer, and emphasized that the
“respondents wish to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at
once.”163 Given the enormity of the case, the Court appeared reluctant to
find the “glue” that would bind the claims together, thus making it “impossible to say” that there is a commonality of the actions.164 In the Court’s view,
there was simply no “specific employment practice” to tie the “1.5 million
claims together.”165
The Court’s repeated emphasis of the size of the class and the employer
cannot be overstated. For the sake of brevity, this Article will not go through
each instance. However, a few illustrative examples will help clarify the
importance that the Court placed on these elements of the case. As the
Court provided,
In a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction. . . .
....
. . . [W]hen the claim is that a company operates under a general policy
of discrimination, a few anecdotes selected from literally millions of employment decisions prove nothing at all.
161 Cf. id. at 119 (questioning whether “the class is too heterogeneous to support collective treatment” and concluding that “the class action would not be sustainable”).
162 See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97, 161 (2009) (“If upheld, the Ninth Circuit panel’s affirmance of class certification
in Dukes effectively would set into motion pressure on the defendant to embrace by way of
settlement precisely the kinds of remedies to which scholarship in the vein of structural
discrimination points—say, to have Wal-Mart engage in ongoing consultation with human
resource professionals, plaintiffs’ lawyers, employee groups, and insurers to redesign its
employment structure.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class
Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1823, 1875 (2008) (noting that the “intense pressure to settle” class claims has been
described as resulting in “judicial blackmail” used by plaintiffs’ attorneys).
163 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552; see id. at 2547, 2555–57.
164 Id. at 2552.
165 Id. at 2555–56.
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....
. . . [The class members] held a multitude of different jobs, at different
levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores,
sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and
female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed . . . . Some
thrived while others did poorly. They have little in common but their sex
and this lawsuit.166

The size of Wal-Mart and of the action against it are the threads that
hold the decision together. Where a massive claim has been brought against
this type of employer, there must be more than “a few anecdotes” of discrimination.167 In this type of instance, the Court seemed to be asking for the
smoking-gun memorandum instructing its managers to discriminate.168
With no memorandum forthcoming, there were simply too many differences
between the individual stores and plaintiffs. Therefore, there was no commonality, and the class claim could not proceed.169
The Wal-Mart rule created by the Court provides that where a massive
claim has been brought against a massive employer, the plaintiff will have a
heightened burden of proof in establishing commonality. Or, at a minimum,
the courts will examine the commonality requirement much more closely.
But what the decision omits is any discussion of the vast majority of class
action cases that look nothing like Wal-Mart at all. The Court noted that this
was one of the largest systemic claims “ever,”170 yet it failed to instruct us on
how to analyze a lesser claim involving a smaller defendant with fewer allegations of discrimination. This is likely because the decision was really only
intended to apply to the Wal-Mart situation itself.
Given the heavy reliance of the opinion on the size of Wal-Mart and the
putative class, then, this Article proposes that the Court’s opinion should be
limited to the fact pattern before it. Wal-Mart should be cabined and
restricted to its facts. The problems of litigating this type of class action are
obvious, and the Court’s reluctance to certify is easily understood. The
problems in litigating a less massive class action are not as notable and have
been routinely undertaken by the courts.171
166 Id. at 2555, 2556 n.9, 2557 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition, the Court noted that “[e]ven if [the statistical proof] established (as it does
not) a pay or promotion pattern that differs from the nationwide figures or the regional
figures in all of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores, that would still not demonstrate that commonality
of issue exists.” Id. at 2555.
167 Id. at 2556 n.9.
168 Cf. id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The plaintiffs’ evidence, including class
members’ tales of their own experiences, suggests that gender bias suffused Wal–Mart’s
company culture.” (footnote omitted)).
169 Id. at 2561.
170 Id. at 2547 (majority opinion).
171 See generally Mary Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L.
REV. 157, 186 (1998) (noting that “[a]t some point between the late 1980s and the mid1990s, class action certification for mass torts ceased to be extraordinary and appeared to
become, if not routine, not wholly unusual”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at
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If the Wal-Mart decision could be cabined, it would have obvious procedural benefits for plaintiffs. Limited in this way, the Wal-Mart decision would
have little or no impact on the legal landscape. The vast majority of class
cases are much smaller in size and scope than Wal-Mart, and the decision
would be inapplicable to these claims.172 Plaintiffs in other cases would be
free to seek certification of their claims without a heightened inquiry of commonality. Rather, the courts would examine this question as they had done
in the past. This would preserve all of the benefits of class claims that the
critics of Wal-Mart argue have been destroyed.173 Most notably, the ability to
bring a systemic claim against an employer with relaxed administrative
requirements would remain intact.174 And, the ability to deter the employer
from discriminating under even the threat of such a class action claim would
still endure.175 By restoring these benefits, the Wal-Mart gap would be filled.
Limiting the Wal-Mart decision might have some unintended consequences, however. If only large employers are ultimately protected by the
decision, it could encourage companies and industry to consolidate in an
effort to thwart this type of systemic litigation. It is unclear how realistic of a
possibility this would be. Nonetheless, the temptation of firms to insulate
themselves from class litigation would serve as a powerful incentive for these
companies to consider merging to increase their size. Moreover, to the
extent that Wal-Mart can be seen as favorable legal precedent, limiting the
decision would undue much of the positive impact of the case. Though this
Article takes no express view on the validity of the decision, a strong argument can be made that Wal-Mart advances class action law. And, some may
view the decision as providing much needed guidance on the interpretation
of commonality under the federal rules.176 Though there is obvious room
for debate on these questions, restricting Wal-Mart to mega-suits would certainly also limit any positive benefits of the decision.
As a procedural mechanism, cabining Wal-Mart may not be a practicable
solution. The counterargument is straightforward—Wal-Mart is not only
about massive lawsuits and applies to all employers. The Court’s repeated
Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 842 (1998) (“[T]he class action device still holds promise
as an efficient means for rendering a considered and consistent decision on issues of fault,
causation, and liability.”).
172 See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547 (noting that Wal-Mart represents one of the largest
systemic claims “ever”).
173 See supra note 61 (setting forth some of the existing scholarship on the Wal-Mart
decision).
174 See supra Section II.A (discussing relaxed administrative requirements for class
action claims).
175 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (addressing the deterrent effect of class
action lawsuits).
176 Cf. Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 637 (2011) (“The Dukes case has the potential of redefining the
terms on which this critical procedural device [the class action] is available.”); Nagareda,
supra note 162, at 162 (noting that “the panel majority in Dukes reversed this analytical
sequence and then left off its most important step: that of declaring ‘what the law is’”).
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reliance on the size of the employer and class seems to belie this argument,
but it will ultimately be a matter for the lower courts to decide how broadly to
apply the decision.177 In the end, the Wal-Mart rule proposed by this Article
is well supported by the Court’s own logic, and offers an additional way
around the decision for victimized employees. The procedural strategy of
cabining Wal-Mart should be advanced by plaintiffs and seriously considered
by the courts. This strategy offers another way to fill the Wal-Mart gap.
4. Taking Wal-Mart at Its Word
A final procedural approach to addressing Wal-Mart runs contrary to the
previously discussed strategy of cabining the decision. This approach would
be to simply take Wal-Mart at its word and apply the decision broadly to all
employment discrimination cases.
By taking Wal-Mart at its word, plaintiffs that might otherwise pursue
class action claims would instead file suit individually against the employer.
This could mean that employers that would typically be subject to a single
class action claim may now be facing hundreds or even thousands of individual actions. In Wal-Mart, for example, the class certified by the lower courts
included over a million individual claims.178 Wal-Mart does not prevent
these plaintiffs from filing suit against their employer individually.179 If anything, the decision expressly encourages it.180 A lack of commonality
between the claims suggests that each claim should be examined individually.
Rather than attempting to find a way around Wal-Mart, then, plaintiffs
can simply embrace it. By filing thousands of individual cases against an
employer, the company may ultimately become overwhelmed and completely
bogged down by the litigation. Instead of defending against one suit, companies will find themselves litigating individual cases across the country. This
strategy could put employers in the situation of being careful for what they
wished for, as Wal-Mart may not be the answer to their litigation problems.181
This is particularly true where the voluminous individual litigation would
result in inconsistent judgments against the employer.182
From a procedural perspective, this strategy would involve massive
organization by plaintiffs’ attorneys. As each individual case would require
careful adherence to the administrative requirements of Title VII, the prospective plaintiffs would want to make certain that they have exhausted these
requirements. And a careful analysis of which suits to bring initially—and in
177 See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547, 2552, 2555–57 (discussing size of Wal-Mart and
the proposed class).
178 Id. at 2547 (“The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the certification
of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs . . . .”).
179 See id. at 2541–61 (discussing the authorization of class certification when individual
class members are entitled to different individualized relief).
180 See id. at 2559 (referring to the option for plaintiffs to “go it alone”).
181 See generally Hitch, supra note 64, at 759 (noting that “protecting defendants from
multiple, inconsistent verdicts” is a benefit of class action litigation).
182 Id.
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what jurisdiction—would also be critical to the overall success of this strategy.183 Certainly plaintiffs would want to bring the most egregious discrimination cases first in jurisdictions that are particularly sympathetic to these
types of claims.184 Early success in a mass individual litigation setting would
increase the likelihood of settlement of the later cases.185 By taking the decision at its word, plaintiffs could exploit—rather than fill—the Wal-Mart gap
and use it as a sword against employers that have discriminated against their
workforce.
This type of organization would be extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
structure.186 However, successful organization of these claims could have
enormous payoff, both financially and through the attainment of injunctive
relief against those that run astray of civil rights rules and regulations.187 It
would not be the first time that civil plaintiffs have taken part in an orchestrated nationwide litigation strategy.188 And civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs also have a well-known history of organizing around
common causes and the vindication of individual rights.189
The strategy of foregoing class action litigation and pursuing mass individual litigation against employers could be enormously burdensome for
defendants. The companies would be required to bear the burden of the
183 See, e.g., Eva Paterson et al., Equal Justice—Same Vision in a New Day, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 22, 25 (2005) (noting the strategy used in Brown v. Board of Education which
“combined the use of successive legal openings created by litigation, the innovative use of
social science, and collaboration with civil rights organizations linked to varied sectors of
society”).
184 See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Lara, Lawrence, Supreme Court Litigation, and Lessons
from Social Movements, 40 TULSA L. REV. 25, 43 (2004) (noting “that the civil rights movement prevailed at least in part by using a strategy of educating the Court by bringing case
after egregious case”).
185 See Benjamin J. Siegel, Note, Applying a “Maturity Factor” Without Compromising the
Goals of the Class Action, 85 TEX. L. REV. 741, 757 (2007) (“The rational defendant facing an
early rash of individualized but related claims will no doubt seek to settle the claims with
the highest likelihood for success for the plaintiffs at trial and choose to litigate those
claims in which it believes it has the greatest chance for success.” (footnote omitted)).
186 See Macey & Miller, supra note 148, at 9 (discussing difficulties of organizing claims
outside the class action context, which can result in “a nightmare”).
187 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 118, at 862 (“The individual plaintiffs in many Title VII
class actions already face the prospect of litigating against multi-billion dollar multinational
corporations. That economic imbalance would only be exacerbated by the necessity of
fighting the same battle on multiple fronts.” (footnote omitted)).
188 See Paterson et al., supra note 183, at 25 (discussing litigation strategy used in Brown
v. Board of Education); Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New
Disparate Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2188 (2010) (noting the successful litigation strategy for developing unintentional discrimination cases, which “consisted of filing a substantial number of disparate-impact claims[,] . . . developing a monitoring system to identify
appropriate cases, and making strategic choices about the most promising cases to
pursue”).
189 See Paterson et al., supra note 183, at 25 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education
litigation strategy); Seiner & Gutman, supra note 188, at 2188 (discussing litigation strategy
used to develop disparate impact claims).
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defense in each specific case that is brought.190 And in those cases where the
defendant loses the claim, the plaintiff can seek attorneys’ fees as part of the
recovery.191 Defendants would lose all of the efficiencies and economies of
scale that come with class action suits.192 Instead of a single case that could
be quickly settled, employers may now be scrambling to defend individual
claims brought throughout the country.193 Of course, employers may ultimately prevail in the individual cases and not face some of the potential damages that would otherwise be incurred. The attorneys’ fees alone in these
cases, however, would be an enormous cost to employers—even where the
company ultimately prevails in the suit.194
Needless to say, this strategy comes at a cost for plaintiffs. While some
employment discrimination victims may benefit and have the opportunity to
present their claims in court, other prospective plaintiffs may fall through the
cracks of the litigation. In this regard, some individuals may not file a timely
charge of discrimination or may fail to file suit in a timely manner.195 Other
victims may be unaware of their rights and not file a charge at all.196 Still
others may not feel comfortable with the prospect of individual litigation in
the federal courts against their employer and decide not to pursue their
claims.197 And many cases which might have only a marginal value associ190 See Developments in the Law—The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1810
(2000) [hereinafter Paths of Civil Litigation] (“Class actions can be similarly beneficial to
defendants, who save costs by litigating or settling all similar claims against them in a single
trial, thereby barring all future liability based on such claims.”).
191 See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978) (“It can
thus be taken as established, as the parties in this case both acknowledge, that . . . a [Title
VII] prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.”); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers,
9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 181 (2006) (discussing attorney’s fees in employment discrimination cases).
192 See Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 190, at 1810 (noting benefits to defendants of
class action litigation).
193 See generally id. at 1810–14 (discussing how multiple suits (including multiple class
actions) require “defendants to expend duplicative resources defending similar claims in
multiple fora”).
194 Cf. Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment:
The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995) (“Unsuccessful frivolous litigation is
expensive for employers and society; successful frivolous litigation is even more expensive.
And, as frivolous litigation mounts, so will successful frivolous litigation.”).
195 See Joseph M. Aldridge, Note, Pay-Setting Decisions as Discrete Acts: The Court Sharpens
Its Focus on Intent in Title VII Actions in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct.
2162 (2007), 86 NEB. L. REV. 955, 958 n.9 (2007) (discussing filing requirements for Title
VII claims).
196 See generally Seiner, supra note 115, at 495 (“[I]t would not be unusual for an
employer that maintains a workplace permeated with discrimination to be sued by only
one or two individuals.”).
197 Id. (“[V]ictims of employment discrimination are particularly hesitant to bring
claims for fear of retaliation, disruption of the workplace environment, or concern over
the perception of their coworkers.”).
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ated with them may not ultimately be pursued.198 Moreover, as already
noted, the appellate courts have largely concluded that “the pattern-or-practice method of proof is not available to private, nonclass plaintiffs.”199 Additionally, it may be more difficult—and not as cost effective—to conduct any
needed statistical analysis with individual claims. Thus, individual litigation
cannot achieve many of the same benefits as class action lawsuits. Such suits
offer safety in numbers, relaxed administrative requirements, streamlined
costs and efficiencies, and discovery, which can help identify potential victims.200 Class action claims, where settled, also offer recovery for all victims.201 In individual litigation, many victims of discrimination may
ultimately lose their case through procedural pitfalls, poor lawyering, or an
unsympathetic jury.
Similarly, this strategy comes at an immense cost to the entire judicial
system. By encouraging mass individual litigation, the Wal-Mart decision may
end up increasing the workload of the federal courts.202 Wal-Mart itself
offers a valuable lesson in this regard. The decision involves over a million
potential victims of discrimination.203 If even a tenth of these individuals
decided to pursue individual litigation instead of bringing a class claim, the
courts would be burdened with over a hundred thousand additional cases.
The efficiencies of Rule 23 would be lost. This multiplier effect could overwhelm the courts. Employment discrimination cases already make up a substantial portion of the federal court docket.204 Wal-Mart may only increase
the number of individual cases that the federal courts must address. And,
while many class action suits are ultimately settled,205 the sheer volume of
individual cases would assure that some of these claims result in a trial.
Taking Wal-Mart at its word may be an effective procedural strategy for
plaintiffs. Rather than pursuing class claims, employment discrimination victims may carefully organize and bring individual suits. For the reasons noted
above, however, the strategy is not without risks or costs. The multiplication
of litigation could ultimately prove overwhelming for both defendants and
198 See generally Hoffman, supra note 118, at 862 (“[W]ith multi-district coordination for
pre-trial purposes, the complexity and expense of litigating the same issues in multiple
venues would be enormous, sometimes even prohibitive.”).
199 See supra note 54.
200 See generally Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 190, at 1808–10 (discussing benefits
of class action litigation).
201 See id. at 1810 (“[A]n increased number of plaintiffs receive compensation for their
injuries in a more timely fashion.”).
202 Id. (“The class action thus frees the court system to adjudicate more claims with less
delay.”).
203 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
204 See Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting the
Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 623 (2005) (“[J]udges regularly
decry the number of labor and employment cases that occupy their dockets.”).
205 See Charles B. Casper, The Class Action Fairness Act’s Impact on Settlements, 20 ANTITRUST 26, 26 (2005) (“It is not surprising that the parties settle most antitrust class actions,
like most other class actions of every kind, and that only a tiny fraction ever go to trial.”).
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the courts. Rather than filling the Wal-Mart gap, this strategy uses it to the
advantage of discrimination victims. But it comes with a price.
C. Revised Relief
The governmental and procedural responses to Wal-Mart set forth above
are effective ways of addressing the potential negative effects of the decision.
A final way of filling the Wal-Mart gap would be to take a renewed look at the
relief available in employment discrimination cases. This Article suggests
that in light of Wal-Mart, the time has come to reanalyze the effectiveness of
punitive relief under Title VII, and for plaintiffs to more aggressively seek
exemplary damages.206 Punitive damages serve many of the same goals as
class action litigation. To the extent that the Supreme Court has weakened
the role of systemic litigation, the role of punitive damages in employment
discrimination cases should be enhanced. Of the potential plaintiff
responses to Wal-Mart discussed here, this approach is admittedly the least
practical to implement. But it is worth exploring as it offers substantial
potential benefits to employment discrimination victims.
I have previously explored the viability of punitive (or exemplary) damages in employment discrimination cases and have explained how this form
of relief falls far short of providing an effective remedy for plaintiffs.207 From
both an empirical and anecdotal perspective, punitive damages do not live
up to the threat that they purport to be for Title VII litigation.208 The goals
of punitive damages are oft stated and include deterrence, retribution, and
education.209 The goals of exemplary damages in the employment discrimination setting are not as clear, but focus on deterrence and compensation to
the victim.210 The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that, in a more
general sense, “the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”211
206 It is worth noting that punitive damages are available in claims under Title VII and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(4) (2006). Exemplary relief is
not available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which offers liquidated
damages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006).
207 See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 795–96 (2008).
208 Id.
209 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491–92 (2008) (discussing purposes
of punitive relief); Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1670 (2005) (discussing role of punitive
damages); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 374–78 (1994) (same); Seiner, supra note 207, at 745–47 (2008) (same).
210 See Seiner, supra note 115, at 487 (citing legislative history of Title VII); Seiner,
supra note 207, at 749–50 (discussing purpose of exemplary relief in employment cases).
211 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 492. See generally Seiner, supra note 115 (discussing
recent Supreme Court case law on punitive damages).
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Class action employment discrimination litigation serves many of the
same functions as punitive damages for workplace claimants.212 Even the
threat of class claims succeeds in deterring discriminatory conduct.213
Employers are fully aware of the potential for mass litigation, as well as the
enormous awards and attorneys’ fees that are associated with these lawsuits.214 Though many employers strictly comply with Title VII for altruistic
reasons, others likely do so to avoid embroiling themselves in systemic disputes.215 Similarly, class claims can be seen as a form of retribution, and they
certainly punish those employers that discriminate. Though punishment is
not necessarily a goal of Title VII, the multi-million dollar verdicts and settlements often associated with systemic litigation can be seen as a way to penalize those employers that run afoul of civil rights legislation.216
Class action claims also educate the public and employers more generally. These mass claims often make headlines and serve the goal of informing the public about employment discrimination laws.217 Finally, systemic
litigation also helps compensate individual victims of workplace abuse.218 As
noted above, many individuals who suffer from employment discrimination
may be unable or afraid to pursue their claims.219 The class action offers a
mechanism for these victims to recover for their injuries, often through a
broad settlement of all claims.220
Class action litigation thus serves the same broad functions as punitive
damages for employment discrimination plaintiffs. Systemic cases serve to
212 See Levit, supra note 120, at 379–80 (“Long before theorists began noticing that the
large-scale remedies required in class action lawsuits had the power to restructure the
workplace, class actions were transforming other social institutions, such as schools and
prisons.”).
213 See Kotkin, supra note 62, at 1337 (“[T]he deterrent aspect of Title VII is far more
pronounced in the systemic realm.”).
214 See Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 190, at 1809–10 (“Because increased access to
the courts leads to more judgments against tortfeasors, the class action deters potential
defendants from externalizing the costs of their actions by causing widespread, but individually minimal, harm.”).
215 Cf. Levit, supra note 120, at 372 (“Although the threats of large economic losses
(from litigation defense costs and risks of damage awards) and adverse publicity can be the
catalysts for settlement, those economic risks do not, on their own, seem to be sufficient
factors to prompt significant restructuring of workplaces.”).
216 Cf. Seiner, supra note 115, at 488 (“Though not identical to the purposes Congress
expressed for adding punitive relief to Title VII, punishment and deterrence can certainly
be seen as playing a role in civil rights litigation more broadly.”).
217 See, e.g., 1 Fred Alvarez et al., Class Actions and Pattern and Practice Claims: Overview of
Theories, Defenses, Settlements and the Government’s Activist Role, in 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 280–81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H591, 1998) (“[H]eadlines over the last several years have been filled with stories of record
settlements reached in various race and gender discrimination class action lawsuits.”).
218 See Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 190, at 1809–10 (discussing benefits of class
action litigation).
219 See Seiner, supra note 115, at 495 (discussing hesitation of some victims to bring
employment discrimination claims).
220 See Casper, supra note 205, at 26 (discussing settlement of class action claims).
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compensate victims, educate the public, punish employers that violate the
law, and deter others from discriminating.221 By potentially eroding the benefits of class claims, Wal-Mart leaves many of the goals of Title VII unfulfilled.
The decision largely undermines the ability of plaintiffs to bring systemic discrimination claims, thus making the benefits of these actions unavailable to
many victims.222 This is where punitive damages can step in and help fill the
Wal-Mart gap.
As punitive damages serve many of the same functions as class action
claims, courts and litigants could use this form of relief to fill the void left by
the Wal-Mart decision. Plaintiffs should be more aggressive in pleading for
punitive relief, and the courts should more actively entertain this type of
claim. In the employment discrimination context, punitive damages are generally appropriate where a managerial agent—acting with knowledge of the
law—violates Title VII.223 The employer also has the opportunity to demonstrate that it was acting in good faith to avoid liability for punitive
damages.224
The government, and civil rights groups, should actively seek out and
prosecute cases that meet this standard. Though egregiousness is not a necessary element to attain punitive relief,225 those cases with a particularly
unsympathetic employer are likely to yield higher exemplary damages.226
Thus, where possible, plaintiffs should prosecute those claims with egregious
fact patterns where the employer had knowledge that it was acting contrary
to the tenets of Title VII. As already discussed, the EEOC is in the best position to select these cases, as it has the opportunity to initially review the
claims before a lawsuit is ever filed.227 Victims of discrimination must file a
221 See Owen, supra note 209, at 374–77 (discussing role of punitive damages).
222 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
223 See Seiner, supra note 115, at 501–10 (discussing situations where punitive relief is
appropriate under Title VII).
224 See id. at 509–12 (discussing the role of good faith in punitive damage awards).
225 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (“We have concluded that
an employer’s conduct need not be independently ‘egregious’ to satisfy [§] 1981a’s
requirements for a punitive damages award, although evidence of egregious misconduct
may be used to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”).
226 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 160–61 (2002) (“The studies have common findings: although there are variations across geographical area and type of case, punitive
damages are not often awarded, are rarely extreme in size, are awarded in response to
egregious conduct, and are not often collected in the amounts awarded by juries.”);
Michael W. Roskiewicz, Note, Title VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory Caps from the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 391, 416 (1993) (“It also suggests that when a jury awards a large amount in
punitive damages, it is likely because the employer’s conduct was particularly
outrageous.”).
227 See Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm (last visited Nov. 18,
2013) (providing an overview of the EEOC’s role in enforcing employment discrimination
statutes).
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charge with the government prior to bringing suit, giving the EEOC the
unique opportunity to select and pursue those claims that are most likely to
yield punitive damages.228 To the extent Wal-Mart applies primarily to larger
employers, this also affords the government the opportunity to focus on
claims against bigger companies. And, under the sliding scale provided by
Title VII, larger employers are potentially subject to higher punitive damage
awards.229
Similarly, the courts should be particularly sympathetic to claims for
punitive relief against employers. Though the judiciary is obviously bound by
the legal standards outlined in Title VII and set forth by the Supreme Court
for exemplary relief, the lower courts should not apply these standards too
rigidly as they have done in the past.230 The issue of punitive damages is
largely a jury question, and the courts should err on the side of allowing the
trier-of-fact to resolve the matter.231 Research has shown that punitive damages have had little impact in Title VII litigation.232 If a more vibrant exemplary damage scheme can be effectuated, it would substantially help fill the
Wal-Mart gap.
Moreover, in light of Wal-Mart, the time has come to revisit the role of
punitive damages in employment discrimination cases more broadly. Punitive and compensatory relief is currently capped in Title VII cases to a maximum combined amount of $300,000 for the largest employers.233 And these
caps are substantially lower for smaller companies.234 These amounts have
remained static since punitive and compensatory damages were added to
Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.235 Given the impact of inflation over the last two decades, punitive relief is a far less effective weapon
than it was when the amendments were originally passed. Indeed, it would
take over $500,000 in today’s dollars to have the same impact as a $300,000
award when the caps originally went into effect.236
228 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006) (providing administrative requirements for filing charge of employment discrimination under Title VII).
229 See id. § 1981a(b)(3).
230 See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535 (setting forth standards for punitive relief in employment discrimination cases). See generally Seiner, supra note 207, at 756–75 (discussing the
punitive damages awarded by lower courts in employment discrimination cases).
231 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2332 (2013) (“By authority of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, any party may demand a trial by jury when compensatory
or punitive damages are sought under Title VII.” (footnote omitted)).
232 See generally Seiner, supra note 207, at 751–56 (discussing punitive damage awards in
Title VII cases in the federal courts).
233 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
234 See id.
235 See Seiner, supra note 207, at 781 (“[T]he statutory caps on [Title VII] exemplary
awards have remained unchanged for over fifteen years.”).
236 See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Nov. 19, 2013); see also Seiner, supra note 207, at 781 (discussing
effect of inflation on punitive awards); Sandra Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227, 243 (2009) (“Further, most caps do not adjust for inflation.
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For punitive damages to be an effective substitute for class action claims,
these caps must either be raised substantially or completely eliminated. A
single $300,000 award is not likely to grab the attention of a Fortune 500
company. However, a multi-million dollar award likely would, and it would
thus serve as a powerful incentive to deter future abusive conduct. Similarly,
large punitive awards would also attract substantial media attention and help
inform the public of the risks associated with overt discrimination.237 And
heightened awards will also compensate those victims whose lives have been
so negatively affected by the unlawful conduct of large corporations.238
Finally, large punitive awards will punish—in a meaningful way—those
employers that do discriminate with full knowledge of the illegality of their
actions.239
The current caps prevent any of these traditional goals of punitive damages from being effectively carried out.240 If the caps were eliminated, it
would go a long way toward reinstating the purpose of Title VII litigation.241
This would, however, leave obvious concerns over juries awarding inappropriate awards that would exceed what is warranted by the facts of the case. In
these circumstances, however, the courts could reduce the amount of the
award through remittitur.242 Like in many other areas of the law, the courts
would police the individual jury verdicts for excessiveness.243 Indeed, this is
already done in Title VII litigation, where awards are often reduced by the
For example, the Title VII caps do not adjust for inflation, so although they were enacted
in 1991, they have not been increased since.” (footnote omitted)).
237 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405, 1405
(2004) (“Because of the magnitude of punitive damages, headlines often tout the levels of
penalties being imposed and the economic horrors that could result from such awards.”).
238 See Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability for Employee/Agent
Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 39, 45–46 (1994) (“Through amendments in 1991, in
order to ‘legislatively overrule’ a number of limiting interpretations of Title VII and Section 1981 by the Supreme Court, Congress significantly expanded the remedies available
under Title VII to more adequately compensate victims and deter unlawful discrimination.” (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 102, § 1981a, 105 Stat.
1071, 1071–74, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 1988 (Supp. V 1993))).
239 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492–93 (2008) (“Regardless of the
alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at
compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”).
240 See Philip L. Bartlett II, Disparate Treatment: How Income Can Affect the Level of Employer
Compliance with Employment Statutes, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 419, 468 (2002) (“The
problem with statutory caps is that they reduce the average remedy by imposing a ceiling
on an award, regardless of the actual damages a plaintiff sustained.”).
241 See Roskiewicz, supra note 226, at 418 (“Only by eliminating the caps on compensatory and punitive damages available to Title VII discrimination victims can Congress
accomplish its initial goal of absolute equality.”).
242 See, e.g., Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 262–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing remittitur in punitive damage workplace context); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731,
736–39 (2003) (defining remittitur).
243 See generally Thomas, supra note 242, at 747–62 (discussing historical uses of
remittitur).
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courts.244 The only difference would be that the courts would have more
discretion in determining the appropriate amount of the award, which could
be in excess of $300,000 if the caps were eliminated. Similarly, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that punitive awards must comply with due process
constraints and has expressed a concern over runaway jury awards.245 The
federal courts have the expertise and experience necessary to monitor these
awards and to make sure that they are within acceptable levels.
This is certainly not the first time that this proposal has been made, and
others have already persuasively argued for eliminating the existing caps.246
My previous scholarship has even suggested that punitive damages be
replaced with liquidated relief, and that the courts reformulate the way they
approach exemplary damages.247 Indeed, legislation has even been proposed that would accomplish the goal of abolishing the statutory caps.248
This Article admittedly does not offer a novel idea in this regard. What it
does do, however, is re-engage this debate in light of the controversial WalMart decision. And, it explains how a more vibrant approach to exemplary
relief can help fill the gap left by Wal-Mart, thus helping to vindicate victims
of employment discrimination. This decision will serve as a landmark—and
potential low point—for civil rights litigants for years to come. This paper
thus revisits the punitive relief debate at a critical juncture in civil rights litigation. In the absence of class action employment discrimination, punitive
damages must take on a greater role.
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision, this Article advocates
that plaintiffs and the government more actively pursue punitive relief, that
the courts more willingly entertain these claims, and that Congress eliminate
the current limits on relief. I acknowledge that this is a broad proposal. Asking for the courts to be more sympathetic to claims for exemplary damages is
a substantial request, and one that may go disregarded. And civil rights advocates must be careful in the cases that they select—and how they present the
evidence—to help achieve the goals outlined here. Similarly, asking for con244 See, e.g., Thorne v. Welk Inv., 197 F.3d 1205, 1211–12 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing
punitive damage remittitur in workplace discrimination case); Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing
a Title VII Punitive Damage Award Without an Accompanying Compensatory or Nominal Award:
Further Unifying the Federal Civil Rights Laws, 89 KY. L.J. 581, 600–01 (2001) (noting that
“Title VII defendants often make a motion for a new trial or a motion for remittitur,
thereby forcing the court to evaluate the amount of the punitive damages award” (footnotes omitted)).
245 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008); Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007); Seiner, supra note 115, at 496 (discussing due process
and runaway jury concerns of Supreme Court).
246 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 240, at 468 (“Congress could also raise, or eliminate,
the statutory caps on the size of compensatory and punitive damage awards that a successful plaintiff can receive.”); Roskiewicz, supra note 226, at 394 (“Congress should lift all caps
on damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination.”).
247 See Seiner, supra note 207, at 776–95.
248 See id. at 783 n.272 (citing Stephen Allred, Commentary: Congress Acts to Overturn
Supreme Court’s Wage Discrimination Decision in Ledbetter, N.C. L. WKLY., Aug. 20, 2007).
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gressional intervention to lift the caps is not easily done, and revising legislation is difficult to accomplish.249 Nonetheless, the time to act is now. WalMart is just one of several recent Supreme Court decisions undermining the
protections afforded to workplace litigants.250 Re-evaluating punitive
relief—either through more aggressive litigation or legislation—can help
civil rights protections from being eroded further.
III. IMPLICATIONS

OF

PROPOSED APPROACH

In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court weakened the class action mechanism
for civil rights litigants, undermining an important tool for Title VII plaintiffs. The benefits of identifying creative responses to Wal-Mart cannot be
understated. The governmental approach, procedural response, and revised
relief all offer promising approaches to this decision. This Part briefly summarizes those benefits, and situates this argument within the scope of the
broader academic scholarship.
If the government, which is not subject to Rule 23, were to take a more
active role in pursuing systemic discrimination claims, it would result in a
number of clearly identifiable benefits. In particular, the EEOC can often
recover for victims that have not filed a timely charge or have not been identified at the time the complaint is filed.251 The EEOC can also seek both
monetary relief and injunctive relief for victims of company-wide discrimination.252 Nonetheless, the government may lack the resources necessary to fill
the role previously performed by the private plaintiffs’ bar. And while the
EEOC often acts for the benefit of victims, its interests are not always completely aligned with those of the individual claimants.253
Similarly, the procedural responses discussed here offer an additional
way to address Wal-Mart. The offensive use of collateral estoppel and the
consolidation of cases could help streamline mass employment litigation and
result in substantial judicial efficiencies. These procedural tools both simplify employment matters by reducing the amount of litigation necessary in
249 Congressional intervention in the workplace context is certainly not unrealistic,
however. See, e.g., Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043,
1052–53 (2012) (discussing passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act).
250 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011)
(restricting the ability of workplace litigants to pursue complex arbitration claims by finding that class arbitration is inconsistent with the requirements of the Federal Arbitration
Act); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (evaluating discrimination claims under Title
VII); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642–43 (2007) (affirming
denial of the plaintiff’s pay discrimination claim because it was not brought “within the
period prescribed by statute”), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (2006)).
251 See supra Section II.A (discussing possible role of EEOC in responding to Wal-Mart
decision).
252 See supra Section II.A.
253 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 284–85 (2002); Gen. Tel. Co. of the
Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).
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these cases.254 The mechanisms are particularly attractive for employment
disputes, which often involve the same policies, managers, and facts.255 However, these approaches also have their drawbacks. Specifically, the administrative requirements are not as relaxed as they are in the class action setting,
and these mechanisms are not as powerful of a weapon as cases brought
under Rule 23.256
Plaintiffs may also attempt to minimize the impact of Wal-Mart by limiting the reach of the decision. A strong argument can be made that the decision should only apply to the largest cases brought against the biggest
employers. Cabining Wal-Mart would substantially reduce the impact of the
decision on the legal landscape. Few class claims are as big as the one
brought against Wal-Mart, and no private company is larger.257 This solution
may be difficult to implement, however, as the courts may be reluctant to
limit the decision to massive lawsuits and may apply it more broadly to all
employers.258 A counter strategy would be to take Wal-Mart at its word and
pursue mass individual litigation against employers. This could overwhelm
companies with voluminous litigation and force them to settle many individual disputes. This strategy would also present its own challenges—most specifically finding ways to organize and structure the litigation.259
Finally, given the similarity in goals between punitive damages and class
action relief, the time has come to revisit exemplary relief in employment
cases. A more vibrant and effective damages structure as part of Title VII
would help attain the goals previously accomplished through systemic litigation—deterrence, retribution, and education.260 Such change is extraordinarily difficult to achieve, however, and the courts and legislature may be
reluctant to revitalize the relief available to victims of discrimination. The
idea must be pursued, however, given the importance of replacing the protections previously afforded by class-wide litigation.
As these responses all reflect, no solution is perfect, and each has its own
drawbacks. The class action served as a powerful weapon for civil rights
plaintiffs and acted as a strong deterrent for employer discrimination. No
one tool can take its place. Identifying other means of addressing Wal-Mart,
and carefully critiquing any alternative approach to systemic litigation, will be
critical for Title VII plaintiffs. This Article does not purport to be exhaustive—it only attempts to move the discussion away from the difficulties of
Wal-Mart and towards a solution.
254 See supra subsections II.B.1–2 (discussing procedural responses to Wal-Mart).
255 See supra subsections II.B.1–2.
256 See supra subsections II.B.1–2.
257 See supra subsection II.B.3 (discussing litigation strategy of cabining Wal-Mart).
258 See supra subsection II.B.3.
259 See supra subsection II.B.4 (discussing the litigation strategy of embracing the WalMart decision).
260 See supra note 209 (noting scholarship discussing the role of punitive damages in
litigation).
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As noted throughout this paper, there is a wealth of superb scholarship
already addressing Wal-Mart, and this Article attempts to situate itself within
that literature. In her recent article, Professor Melissa Hart does an excellent
job of identifying the problems created by the Court’s decision.261 Professor
Hart notes that it is “essential to consider other solutions” that would help
address the dilemma created by Wal-Mart.262 She outlines some suggestions,
noting that the EEOC could become more active in pursuing systemic litigation.263 Professor Hart also notes different procedural mechanisms that
could be used, specifically identifying different provisions of the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure.264 Finally, she raises the possibility of attempting to correct the decision through some type of “legislative fix.”265 Professor Hart’s
work superbly identifies the issues created by Wal-Mart, and acknowledges
the need to move the debate toward a remedy. This Article attempts to pick
up where Professor Hart left off by offering additional solutions and carefully
critiquing possible responses to the decision.
Similarly, Professor Suzette Malveaux performed an early and helpful
analysis of the decision.266 She noted the problems inherent with Wal-Mart,
highlighting “the potential to cut short a number of employment discrimination class actions premised on the theory of excessive subjectivity as a discriminatory policy.”267 Professor Malveaux’s work did go farther, however, as it
also began to consider possible ways through the decision. She correctly
observed that the actual impact of Wal-Mart could be limited, as “cases the
size of Dukes are rare,” and “[s]maller classes are bound to be more successful.”268 Professor Malveaux also explored additional ways that plaintiffs
could pursue class actions.269 Thus, while she correctly noted that Wal-Mart
has “tipped the balance in favor of powerful employers over everyday workers,”270 Professor Malveaux also began to identify different ways that plaintiffs may approach the decision. This Article expands upon that very early
analysis, carefully offering different approaches to the decision and considering ways to fill the Wal-Mart gap.
In sum, the early academic literature does an excellent job of highlighting the difficulties that plaintiffs will face when addressing systemic employment discrimination. Some of this work also identifies the need to find a
solution to the problems created by Wal-Mart. The governmental approach,
261 See Hart, supra note 61, at 458–68.
262 Id. at 474.
263 Id. at 475.
264 Id. (discussing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 42).
265 Id. at 474.
266 See Malveaux, supra note 61.
267 Id. at 44.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 51–52 (“Employees bringing a pattern-or-practice employment discrimination
case involving monetary relief can seek certification solely under Rule 23(b)(3) or a
hybrid—where injunctive or declaratory relief is sought under Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary or individualized relief is sought under Rule 23(b)(3).” (footnote omitted)).
270 Id. at 52.
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procedural response, and revised relief proposed here attempt to offer such
a solution. Each approach has its own challenges, however, and plaintiffs
must carefully consider both the benefits and drawbacks before pursuing a
particular approach. Other alternatives surely exist as well, and hopefully
others will identify additional ways to address the problems created by the
decision.
CONCLUSION
Wal-Mart created an enormous challenge for victims of systemic discrimination. The class action is a critical tool in the arsenal of plaintiffs for fighting workplace abuse. Nonetheless, there are numerous ways of addressing
mass litigation that go beyond the strict constraints of Rule 23. The EEOC
should take a more active role in pursuing complex discrimination claims.
Plaintiffs must also consider different procedural mechanisms that are still
available to address company-wide abuse. And the issue of the sufficiency of
punitive relief in Title VII cases should be revisited. These solutions are not a
complete fix, but each approach offers substantial benefits to discrimination
victims. The Court’s decision should be denounced, but it should not go
ignored. Plaintiffs must act quickly to find ways to fill the Wal-Mart gap. This
Article opens the discussion—let the dialogue begin.
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